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On resilience, or acceleration as political value 
 
Nicholas Michelsen 
Kings College London 
 
Zebrowski makes an important contribution to knowledge and understanding of the history of 
Resilience thinking.  His excellent book adds substantially to an existing body of scholarship which 
views Resilience is a “correlate of an emerging order of Liberal government” , but it is much more 
methodologically rigorous than other works that have developed this argument, and develops new 
empirical specifics in the UK context and far greater nuance as a consequence.  Genealogy is 
deployed, in the sense that Foucault and Nietzsche suggested it should be, to emphasise how 
Resilience appears as a value only through its capture and mobilisation by contingent social forces. 
Resilience, Zebrowski argues very convincingly, is not natural. Resilience thinking cannot, therefore, 
be understood as the product of scientific progress in our understanding of the nature of nature 
after the complexity turn. Rather, the value assigned to Resilience and to Resilience thinking is the 
product of a history of struggle, of lost events and strange inconsistencies. As a good genealogist, 
Zebrowski refuses to paint over the contingency involved in any process of value formation.  
For this reason, Zebrowski’s repeatedly refuses to reduce resilience to being a creature of 
Neoliberalism, but rather seeks to examine how multiple understandings of resilience are bound into 
a becoming-Neoliberal which is neither predetermined nor necessary in the UK context. This leaves 
open the possibility of becomings-otherwise to which Resilience may be, or perhaps must be, 
subjected. This clearly means that engaging in the study of the ‘Value of Resilience’ has multiple 
implications for Zebrowski, referencing its problematizing ‘value’ for security discourse, its peculiar 
‘valuation’ as a biopolitical register, and the possibility of alternate political ‘valuations’ gestured 
towards in the conclusion. It is this latter possibility that we ought to be most interested in. 
Zebrowski examines the origins of Resilience thinking in anti-strike policy machineries in the UK, 
which he deems designed to ensure the perpetuation of vital flows in society. His argument is that 
population-life is newly problematized as manageable and technically amenable to government 
under the UK Civil Contingencies apparatus. The promise of nuclear destruction offers a further 
strand to the becoming of Resilience in the UK context, as does the decline of understandings of 
social insurance, changing assumptions about mass behaviour around panic, and the transnational 
logics of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Zebrowski very effectively demonstrates, through a 
number of fields, how a sense of the inadequacies of the protective ‘security’ model accompanied 
the rise of Neoliberal understanding of the state, and contends that biopolitical logics are quite self-
evidently at work in Resilience thinking. The concept of a ‘resilient population’ enunciates a way of 
thinking and being that is peculiar to the governmentality that underpins Neoliberal regimes. 
Resilience and Neoliberalism are correlates but they are also functionally linked together though the 
biopolitical diagram. 
Of course, there are significant differences between suggesting Resilience is functionally linked to 
biopolitics and calling it a “correlate” of neoliberalism, which inserts a potential note of ambiguity 
into the book. I am inclined to be sympathetic to Massumi’s suggestion, noted in the books 
introduction, that something more than biopolitics may be at stake in techniques of resilience. 
Indeed, Zebrowski rejects a teleological reading of Resilience into history, finding that the values 
present in the distinct orders of governance in UK Civil Contingencies are historically layered 
together like the geological accumulation of strata. Does this stratification show that Resilience 
thinking is increasingly a function of biopolitics, in the manner that constitutes something like the 
Foucaultian consensus? Or is Resilience doing independent work which, as Zebrowski puts it, 
presents ‘new imperatives’ to biopower?  
Zebrowski’s understanding of the relationship between resilience thinking and neoliberalism 
certainly seems to go beyond the standard Foucaultian model which sees Resilience thinking as the 
outlet of biopolitical thinking.  This is the sense of his claim that resilience has “no unambiguous 
meaning or self-evident value”, and that “the value of resilience can be attributed to the process 
through which neoliberalism was distinguished as rationality of government from previous 
articulations of liberalism”. Biopower is clearly at not all that is at stake in this shift.  Paul Virilio 
seems an implicit reference when Zebrowski suggests that Resilience thinking is associated with 
technologies of “speed”. That he remains implicit is a shame. In charting the dialogue between 
‘military’ and ‘civil’ thinking, much of Zebrowski’s analysis actually seems rather more resonant of 
Virilio than Foucault. Whilst the biopolitical is repeatedly noted as the key term of art in the book, 
much of the empirical datum which Zebrowski so eloquently charts might imply just as plausibly the 
surrender of Liberalism to a military logistics, which must be at least partially distinct from the 
concept of the biopolitical. For Virilio, the rise of military logistics, and their colonisation of modern 
society, does not imply a new kind of political condition ripe, in Foucaultian style, for the emergence 
of a new populational counter-conduct, resilient or otherwise, rather it implies the death of the 
political itself (understood as a space for securing a collective duration). Surely when disaster 
preparation and recovery have become indistinguishable from one another, as Zebrowski suggests 
they have today, we have left (bio)politics behind altogether for the logics of Pure War. When 
Zebrowski refers to resilience as defined by adaptive speed, perhaps we are not seeing the capture 
of Resilience by biopolitical governmentality, but Liberalism’s capture by a trajectory dedicated to 
permanent self-destruction in the name of a creativity. This necrophiliac social order is more than 
biopolitical. 
Zebrowski references Heidegger’s critique of technology as an important step in his analysis. 
Heidegger’s fear that technological “enframing” would inhibit authentic being (towards-death) finds 
modified re-articulation in Virilio’s call for a return to ‘political time’ in the face of the militaristic 
terror of technological speed. Zebrowski is prudent to follow Foucault in noting that “human 
existence has always been expressed through its engagement with technology”, but the political 
problem of technological being remains hanging over the central question posed by the book:  What 
happens to life ‘which is not adaptive, which refuses to adapt’? If ‘Resilience secures freedom by 
freeing security’, isn’t this a military technological, and so entirely post-political, valuation of 
freedom towards death. In question here is not, simply, the killing of life that does not fit the 
biopolitical mould, but the glorification of perpetual self-overcoming in the name of technical 
progress. 
The problem of the Value of Resilience is the problem of the sustainability of (bio)political value as 
such amidst technological speed.  Zebrowski’s clearly wishes to put the Neoliberal valuation of 
Resilience into question, by revealing the becoming of Resilience  “alongside” the becoming of 
Neoliberal ways of thinking and being in the world. Rather than demonstrating that Resilience has 
become the function of a defined Neoliberalism (“Neoliberalism is an ongoing project”), what he 
shows genealogically is their common intersection with logistics, with the technologies of war, 
without fully writing a genealogy of its (bio)political values. I am highly sympathetic with the gesture 
towards contestation around the possibilities of Resilience, and the productive differencing qualities 
of mimicry, but I was left with a sense that Zebrowski leaves slightly under-developed the  question 
of how Resilience might be linked  to (bio)political values that are not militarily over-coded.  
It is not an invention of Neoliberalism to suggest that a life which cannot change or die is not really 
alive -  it is immortal, divine, unearthly and uncanny  -  and is certainly not political. All forms of 
political life must find their value in conversation with uncertainty and death. However, in arguing at 
the close of the book that the “highest forms of Resilience” are about “self-overcoming”, and that 
this may provide a possible way-out for Resilience thinking from a Neoliberal straightjacket, 
important dangers are glossed over. The problem with Resilience is not necessarily that it may form 
a technology for exclusionary or murderous biopolitical government and control, valorising some 
lives over others, but that it slips into the celebration of generic insecurity when valued in and of 
itself, which tips into generically suicidal accelerations. The answer, Virilio would say, is to bring the 
problem of political duration back in. Political communities have to find ways to endure. The hope 
for a political value of resilience raises questions about the construction of communities of being, of 
collective meanings that are able to subsist though a shared experience of duration. Perhaps 
resilience cannot or should not be seen as a value in itself, but all political values require 
mechanisms to persist though time. The questionable resilience of all (bio)political values amidst 
technological acceleration thus seems to be the problem posed, but perhaps not fully answered, by 
the Value of Resilience. 
 
